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Abstract
Identiﬁcation protocols are powerful tools in many areas of cryptography. A prover’s identity (ID) has n distinct secrets
which in total construct her identity. When a prover, Peggy, wants to prove to a veriﬁer, Victor, that she is the holder
of a certain identity ID and at the same time, she is not willing to reveal these secrets due to privacy concerns, Peggy
must prove to Victor that she indeed knows n witnesses that are related to the public instances that form her identity.
The simplest way to prove this knowledge of n witnesses is to run an identiﬁcation protocol for n times. This naive
method results in protocols that have communication and computational complexities that are linear in the number
of secrets. In this paper, we propose an identiﬁcation protocol based on proof of knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
(DL) representation. This protocol allows the prover to prove her knowledge of some personal information (encoded
in a certain identity ID) without revealing any/some of this information to the veriﬁer, at the same time, prevent the
veriﬁer from impersonating the prover in the future. Furthermore, we tackle the issue of reducing communication and
computation costs.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Identiﬁcation protocols [1] play a crucial role in many applications such as electronic money transfers
and data access control. In an identiﬁcation protocol, the prover proves to the veriﬁer that she is indeed who
she claims to be. Practically, the prover’s identity is encoded in a private key x and a public key g. The
identiﬁcation protocol is executed in a way such that the prover proves to the veriﬁer that she knows the
private key x. Knowledge of the private key can be encoded as the knowledge of the discrete logarithm of
the public key g over a very large group of a prime order. The prover could just tell the veriﬁer the secret x,
and the veriﬁer could verify that x is the correct private key. However, this allows the veriﬁer to impersonate
the prover to a third party, using this information. A feasible identiﬁcation protocol must prevent the veriﬁer
from impersonating the prover if she proves her identity to him for several times.
The concept of identiﬁcation protocols was ﬁrst introduced by Goldwasser et al. [1]. Later on, the ﬁrst
realistic protocol was proposed by Fiat and Shamir [2]. More eﬃcient protocols were later proposed (e.g.,
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the Guillou and Quisquater (GQ) identiﬁcation protocol [3], and the Schnorr identiﬁcation protocol [4].)
The GQ identiﬁcation protocol is based on the RSA [5] problem while the Schnorr identiﬁcation protocol
is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). These two protocols are more eﬃcient and practical than
their predecessors. Nevertheless, the security of both protocols was not initially proven. Recently, the GQ
identiﬁcation protocol and Schnorr’s protocol were proven to be secure [6].
Usually, identiﬁcation protocols based on discrete logarithms or integer factoring have lower eﬃciency
because they require signiﬁcantly longer key sizes. On the other hand, protocols based on elliptic curve
cryptosystems have the advantage that the key size can be much smaller than these other protocols that
can reach the same level of security. Therefore, extensive eﬀorts have been made to ﬁnd more eﬃcient,
and simple identiﬁcation protocols based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithms over a ﬁnite ﬁeld. In the
literature, numerous eﬃcient protocols have been proposed. Kim et al. proposed an identiﬁcation protocol
based on the bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman problem [7]. Kim et al.’s protocol is more eﬃcient than the Schnorr
protocol. Shao et al. proposed an identiﬁcation protocol based on the strong Diﬃe-Hellman assumption [8].
Moreover, other pairing-based identiﬁcation protocols have been proposed such as [9] and [10].
The majority of these protocols assume that the prover’s identity corresponds to a single secret value
and they usually do not consider cases where the prover’s identity corresponds to several distinct secrets. In
this paper, we propose an identiﬁcation protocol that suits the practical scenarios where the user’s identity is
formed from a composition of certiﬁed public values that are related to distinct secrets (e.g., social security
number, driver’s license number, and date of birth). The prover’s identity is encoded in the Discrete Loga-
rithm representation (DL-representation) form. The proposed protocol aims to minimize the communication
and computation costs for both provers and veriﬁers.
This protocol is based on the Group Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption (G-CDH). This protocol
has n distinct secrets and n+2 public keys. The certiﬁcate of these public keys guarantees that they are related
but does not link them to the prover. The computation cost of the second protocol is two multiplication
operations for both the prover and the veriﬁer. The challenge-response communication cost is two points on
the elliptic curve.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the necessary mathemat-
ical background and the security model of identiﬁcation protocols. In section 3, the proposed identiﬁcation
protocol from Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) is presented. Finally, our conclusion is presented in
section 4.
2. Preliminary
2.1. Diﬃe-Hellman problems
Let G be an additive cyclic group of prime order p, and P is its generator. In this group, the well-known
Diﬃe-Hellman problems carry on as follows [11, 12, 13, 14, 15]:
Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH):. Given P, aP, bP ∈ G, compute abP ∈ G.
The (t, )-Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption holds in G if there is no algorithm A : G3 → G
running at a maximum time t such that
Pr[A (P, aP, bP) = abP] ≥ 
where the probability is calculated over all possible choices of (P, a, b).
Inverse Computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem (InvCDH):. Given P, xP, output 1x P, where
1
x denotes the
multiplicative inverse of x ∈ Z∗p.
The (t, )-Inverse Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption holds in G if there is no algorithm A :
G2 → G running at a maximum time t such that
Pr[A (P, xP) =
1
x
P] ≥ 
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where the probability is calculated over all possible choices of (P, x).
Group Computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem (G-CDH):. Given the elements
(
∏
xi) · P, for some subsets of indices i (either all theses subsets, except {1, . . . , n}, or only a part of them),
compute x1 · · · xn · P, where xi ∈ Z∗p [16].
The (t, )-Group Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption holds in G if there is no algorithm A running
in time at most t such that
Pr[A ((
∏
xi) · P) = x1 · · · xn · P] ≥ 
where the probability is taken over all possible choices of (P, xi).
2.2. Security Model of Identiﬁcation Protocols
In an identiﬁcation protocol, the prover proves to the veriﬁer that she is indeed who she claims to be,
in such a way that, the veriﬁer cannot turn around later and impersonate the prover to a third party. In
particular, an identiﬁcation protocol consists of a parameter-generation algorithm (PGA), key-generation
algorithm (KGA), and an interactive proof of knowledge protocol(Prover,Veri f ier). Let 1k be the security
parameter for the algorithms in the identiﬁcation protocol, while (PGA, KGA) are probabilistic polynomial
time algorithms.
Parameter-Generation Algorithm (PGA). This takes the security parameter 1k as input and outputs the
system parameters in a polynomial time. These system parameters are public.
Key-Generation Algorithm (KGA). This takes the security parameter 1k, system parameters, and the prover
/ veriﬁer’s information (such as her/his private keys xi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n) as inputs. It outputs the
prover/veriﬁer’s corresponding public keys gi = xiPi, where the identity is deﬁned as ID =
∑
gi.
The Proof of Knowledge Protocol(Prover,Veri f ier). It has two algorithms that run by the prover and the
veriﬁer. On input of the prover’s public key, private key, and the veriﬁer’s challenge, it outputs the
veriﬁer’s decision 1 (accept) or 0 (reject).
The correctness property requires that if both the prover and the veriﬁer follow the protocol and utilize a
valid public/private key pair, the protocol outputs 1. Moreover, it requires that any cheating prover A that
does not possess the prover’s private keys cannot interact with an honest veriﬁer. Thus A does not outputs
1. Furthermore, it requires that a cheating veriﬁerB cannot interact with the prover, pass on what he learns
to A , and allow A to interact with an honest veriﬁer. The second security condition implies the ﬁrst, in
whichB outputs nothing. This argument can be summarized as follows:
Deﬁnition 1.. A (t, q,  )-identiﬁcation protocol is a triple (KGA, Prover, Veri f ier), where KGA is a prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithm and (Prover, Veri f ier) is a pair of probabilistic interactive machines
running in time at most t, satisfying the following conditions [19]:
Viability: For any i ∈ {0, 1}n, let KGA(i)=(xi, gi). Then
Pr[〈Prover(xi, gi),Veri f ier(gi) 〉 = 1] = 1
Security: For any i ∈ {0, 1}n, let KGA(i) = (xi, gi). For many probabilistic interactive machine B running
in time at most t, let Ti be a random variable describing the output of B(gi) after interacting with
Prover(xi, gi) q times. Then for any probabilistic interactive machine A running in time at most t,
Pr[〈A (gi,Ti),Veri f ier(gi) 〉 = 1] < 
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3. Proof of Knowledge of DL-representation Utilizing ECC
In this section, we present an identiﬁcation protocol based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem over
elliptic curve groups. The prover’s identity has the format of the discrete logarithm function. The discrete
logarithm function can be generalized into the DL-representation form. Similar to [20], we introduce the
notion of the DL-representation in a group deﬁned over an elliptic curve (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Representation) and we denote it ECDLREP.
The ECDLREP will be a function of the form:
f (x1, ..., xn) = (x1 · P1 + . . . + xn · Pn)
where (x1, ..., xn) is a tuple whose elements are in Z∗p . We call this tuple an elliptic curve form of the DL-
representation (ECDLREP) of the summation ID = ( x1 · P1 + . . . + xn · Pn) with respect to the points or
generators (P1 . . . · Pn). The DL-representation protocol enables the prover to demonstrate to a veriﬁer that
she indeed knows a portion (or all) of the DL-representation of a point ID on the elliptic curve with respect
to agreed-upon points or generators (P1 . . . · Pn) while keeping this DL-representation secret.
Our protocol proceeds as follows. First, we choose a security parameter, 1k, that deﬁnes the level of bit
strength that the identiﬁcation scheme will provide. We then need to deﬁne a group G. To do this, we pick
an elliptic curve E
(
Fq
)
with embedding degree d, where q is a prime power and it is the order of the ﬁnite
ﬁeld Fq. Also, p is a prime number such that p|#E
(
Fq
)
where #E
(
Fq
)
is the order of the group E
(
Fq
)
,
which is the number of points on an elliptic curve E over a ﬁeld F, including the point at inﬁnity. Moreover,
the discrete log problem in Z∗p is intractable.
We then randomly pick a point P ∈ E
(
Fq
)
of order p. Let P be the generator of the group G, which is
a cyclic group of order p. G is a cyclic subgroup of E
(
Fq
)
. Let H : G → Z∗p be a cryptographically secure
hash function. In what follow, we introduce a method that allows the prover to demonstrate her knowledge
of a DL-representation over an elliptic curve:
The prover has n secrets. We denote these secrets by xi, i = 1, · · · , n,. Let gi = xi·Pi be the certiﬁed public
value corresponding to xi. Let ID = x1 · P1 + · · · + xn · Pn = ∑ni xi · Pi. The prover sends these certiﬁed
public values to the veriﬁer. Then, the veriﬁer generates a random number y and keeps it secret.We deﬁne
H as a cryptographic hash function: H : G → Z∗p . Proof of knowledge of the ECDLREP is achieved using
the following protocol:
In Figure 1, the prover has two certiﬁed public values (ID, w). Both ID and w are points on an elliptic
curve. The public value, w, is derived from ID in such a way that only the prover can execute it. Moreover,
given w, the prover is the only one who can derive ID. The transformation from w to ID depends on knowl-
edge of all the DL-representations of ID with respect to some generators (g1, . . . , gn). The prover derives
w from ID by multiplying it by 1x1·x2 · ... · xn mod p. The result will be w =
∑n
i
1∏n
j, ji x j
· gi. The veriﬁer wants
to ensure that the two certiﬁed public values ID and w belong to the same person who claims ownership of
both. The veriﬁer challenges the prover, by sending her u= y · w. When the prover receives u from the veri-
ﬁer, she calculates v =x ·u. The prover sends the veriﬁer a response. If the prover’s response is y ·ID, then the
veriﬁer will be convinced that the two certiﬁed public values ID and w belong to the same person. Moreover,
this veriﬁes that she indeed knows all the DL-representations of the point ID, with respect to agreed-upon
generators (g1, . . . , gn). This is done without revealing the DL-representation to the veriﬁer. The prover
sends H(v) in response to the veriﬁer. The veriﬁer compares it to the pre-computed value H(y · ID). If both
values are equal, the veriﬁer accepts the prover’s response, completing the protocol. Otherwise, the veriﬁer
rejects it.
The underlying hard problem is: given (P, x1P1, . . . , xnPn, 1x2·x3···xn P1, . . . ,
1
x1·x2···xn−1 Pn), outputs x1x2 · · · xnP.
This problem is a special case of the Group Computational Diﬃe-Hellman problem (G-CDH). The G-CDH
assumption guarantees that the proposed protocol is secure against impersonation attacks.
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Prover Veri f ier
ID ∈ G andw ∈ G are public randomly choose y as
secret, y ∈ Z∗p
xi ∈ Z∗p are secrets
g1,...,gn, 1x2 ·x3 ···xn P1,...,
1
x1 ·x2 ···xn−1 Pn−→
x =
∏n
i=1 xi modp
gi = xi · Pi
ID = x1 · P1 + · · · + xn · Pn = ∑ni=1 xi · Pi
w = 1x · ID
= 1x2·x3···xn · P1 + · · · + 1x1·x2···xn−1 · Pn
=
∑n
i=1
1∏n
j=1, ji x j
· Pi
u←− u= y · w
v = x · u
H(v)−→ H (v) ?=H (y · ID)
Fig. 1. Proving knowledge of the DL-representation
4. Conclusion
We have presented an eﬃcient identiﬁcation scheme based on elliptic curves. The security of this scheme
is based on the Group Computational Diﬃe-Hellman assumption (G-CDH). This scheme provides attractive
solutions for scenarios where the user identity is formed from a composition of certiﬁed public values that
are related to several distinct secret values.
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